/* $OpenBSD: ssl_clnt.c,v 1.73 2020/09/24 18:12:00 jsing Exp $ */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST #include #endif #include "bytestring.h" #include "ssl_sigalgs.h" #include "ssl_tlsext.h" static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b); int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) { void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; int ret = -1; int new_state, state, skip = 0; ERR_clear_error(); errno = 0; if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->internal->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback; s->internal->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); for (;;) { state = S3I(s)->hs.state; switch (S3I(s)->hs.state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->internal->renegotiate = 1; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; /* break */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_CONNECT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT: case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT: s->server = 0; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = -1; goto end; } } else { if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = -1; goto end; } } /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */ s->internal->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT; if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) { ret = -1; goto end; } /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_connect++; s->internal->init_num = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* mark client_random uninitialized */ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); D1I(s)->send_cookie = 0; s->internal->hit = 0; } break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: s->internal->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ tls1_transcript_reset(s); dtls1_start_timer(s); } ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && D1I(s)->send_cookie) { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; } else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ if (s->bbio != s->wbio) s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->internal->hit) { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) { /* receive renewed session ticket */ S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; } /* No client certificate verification. */ tls1_transcript_free(s); } } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { S3I(s)->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; } else { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; } s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (D1I(s)->send_cookie) /* start again, with a cookie */ S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: ret = ssl3_check_finished(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) { s->internal->hit = 1; if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; } /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH. */ if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) { ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected) S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; } s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; /* * At this point we check that we have the * required stuff from the server. */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req) S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; /* * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert * sent back */ /* * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */ /* * XXX: For now, we do not support client * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. * We need to skip the certificate verify * message when client's ECDH public key is sent * inside the client certificate. */ if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req == 1) { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; } else { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 0; } if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 0; } } s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->internal->hit) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher; if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) { ret = -1; goto end; } if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { ret = -1; goto end; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); break; case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->internal->hit) dtls1_start_timer(s); ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; /* clear flags */ if (s->internal->hit) { S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; } else { /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; else S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; } s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; else s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (s->internal->hit) S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK; s->internal->init_num = 0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* If the write error was fatal, stop trying */ if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) { s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state; } } ret = -1; goto end; } s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ tls1_cleanup_key_block(s); if (S3I(s)->handshake_transcript != NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = -1; goto end; } if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) ssl3_release_init_buffer(s); ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->internal->init_num = 0; s->internal->renegotiate = 0; s->internal->new_session = 0; ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); if (s->internal->hit) s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_hit++; ret = 1; /* s->server=0; */ s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_connect; s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_connect_good++; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* done with handshaking */ D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq = 0; D1I(s)->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; } goto end; /* break; */ default: SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret = -1; goto end; /* break; */ } /* did we do anything */ if (!S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->internal->debug) { if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; } if ((cb != NULL) && (S3I(s)->hs.state != state)) { new_state = S3I(s)->hs.state; S3I(s)->hs.state = state; cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); S3I(s)->hs.state = new_state; } } skip = 0; } end: s->internal->in_handshake--; if (cb != NULL) cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); return (ret); } int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *s) { CBB cbb, client_hello, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites; CBB compression_methods; uint16_t max_version; size_t sl; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; if (ssl_supported_version_range(s, NULL, &max_version) != 1) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); return (-1); } s->client_version = s->version = max_version; if (sess == NULL || sess->ssl_version != s->version || (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || sess->internal->not_resumable) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) goto err; } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ /* * If a DTLS ClientHello message is being resent after a * HelloVerifyRequest, we must retain the original client * random value. */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || D1I(s)->send_cookie == 0) arc4random_buf(s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &client_hello, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) goto err; /* * Version indicates the negotiated version: for example from * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can * choke if we initially report a higher version then * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports * 1.0. * * Possible scenario with previous logic: * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now * know that is maximum server supports. * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret * containing version 1.0. * * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to * the negotiated version. */ if (!CBB_add_u16(&client_hello, s->client_version)) goto err; /* Random stuff */ if (!CBB_add_bytes(&client_hello, s->s3->client_random, sizeof(s->s3->client_random))) goto err; /* Session ID */ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id)) goto err; if (!s->internal->new_session && s->session->session_id_length > 0) { sl = s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sl)) goto err; } /* DTLS Cookie. */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (D1I(s)->cookie_len > sizeof(D1I(s)->cookie)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cookie, D1I(s)->cookie, D1I(s)->cookie_len)) goto err; } /* Ciphers supported */ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites)) return 0; if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &cipher_suites)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); goto err; } /* Add in compression methods (null) */ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_u8(&compression_methods, 0)) goto err; /* TLS extensions */ if (!tlsext_client_build(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_CH, &client_hello)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) goto err; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return (-1); } int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) { CBS cbs, server_random, session_id; uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite; uint16_t min_version, max_version; uint8_t compression_method; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; const SSL_METHOD *method; unsigned long alg_k; size_t outlen; int al, ok; long n; s->internal->first_packet = 1; n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, /* ?? */ &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); s->internal->first_packet = 0; if (n < 0) goto truncated; CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { if (D1I(s)->send_cookie == 0) { S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } else { /* Already sent a cookie. */ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } } } if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &server_version)) goto truncated; if (ssl_supported_version_range(s, &min_version, &max_version) != 1) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); goto err; } if (server_version < min_version || server_version > max_version) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | (server_version & 0xff); al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } s->version = server_version; if ((method = ssl_get_client_method(server_version)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->method = method; /* Server random. */ if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) goto truncated; if (!CBS_write_bytes(&server_random, s->s3->server_random, sizeof(s->s3->server_random), NULL)) goto err; if (!ssl_downgrade_max_version(s, &max_version)) goto err; if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION && s->version < max_version) { /* * RFC 8446 section 4.1.3. We must not downgrade if the server * random value contains the TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.1 magical value. */ if (!CBS_skip(&server_random, CBS_len(&server_random) - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12))) goto err; if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && CBS_mem_equal(&server_random, tls13_downgrade_12, sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12))) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); goto f_err; } if (CBS_mem_equal(&server_random, tls13_downgrade_11, sizeof(tls13_downgrade_11))) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); goto f_err; } } /* Session ID. */ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id)) goto truncated; if (CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* Cipher suite. */ if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &cipher_suite)) goto truncated; /* * Check if we want to resume the session based on external * pre-shared secret. */ if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) { SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, NULL, &pref_cipher, s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; } } if (s->session->session_id_length != 0 && CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, s->session->session_id, s->session->session_id_length)) { if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || timingsafe_memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length) != 0) { /* actually a client application bug */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); goto f_err; } s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; s->internal->hit = 1; } else { /* a miss or crap from the other end */ /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */ s->internal->hit = 0; if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } /* * XXX - improve the handling for the case where there is a * zero length session identifier. */ if (!CBS_write_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id, sizeof(s->session->session_id), &outlen)) goto err; s->session->session_id_length = outlen; s->session->ssl_version = s->version; } if ((cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite)) == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later. */ if ((cipher->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) && (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } if (!ssl_cipher_in_list(SSL_get_ciphers(s), cipher)) { /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that * cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */ if (s->session->cipher) s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; if (s->internal->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != cipher->id)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); goto f_err; } S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = cipher; if (!tls1_transcript_hash_init(s)) goto err; /* * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for * client authentication. */ alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST))) tls1_transcript_free(s); if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &compression_method)) goto truncated; if (compression_method != 0) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } if (!tlsext_client_parse(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_SH, &cbs, &al)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto f_err; } /* * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI * absence on initial connect only. */ if (!S3I(s)->renegotiate_seen && !(s->internal->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); goto f_err; } if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } return (1); truncated: /* wrong packet length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) { int al, i, ok, ret = -1; long n; CBS cbs, cert_list; X509 *x = NULL; const unsigned char *q; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; SESS_CERT *sc; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (n < 0) goto truncated; CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); if (CBS_len(&cbs) < 3) goto truncated; if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cert_list) || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } while (CBS_len(&cert_list) > 0) { CBS cert; if (CBS_len(&cert_list) < 3) goto truncated; if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_list, &cert)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } q = CBS_data(&cert); x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert)); if (x == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto f_err; } if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x = NULL; } i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)) { al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto f_err; } ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ sc = ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (sc == NULL) goto err; ssl_sess_cert_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert); SSI(s)->sess_cert = sc; sc->cert_chain = sk; /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); sk = NULL; /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { x = NULL; al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey); if (i < 0) { x = NULL; al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto f_err; } sc->peer_cert_type = i; CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); /* * Why would the following ever happen? * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x; sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]); X509_free(s->session->peer); CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); s->session->peer = x; s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; x = NULL; ret = 1; if (0) { truncated: /* wrong packet length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); } err: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return (ret); } static int ssl3_get_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY **pkey, CBS *cbs) { CBS dhp, dhg, dhpk; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; SESS_CERT *sc = NULL; DH *dh = NULL; long alg_a; int al; alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; sc = SSI(s)->sess_cert; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &dhp)) goto truncated; if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dhp), CBS_len(&dhp), NULL)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &dhg)) goto truncated; if ((dh->g = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dhg), CBS_len(&dhg), NULL)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &dhpk)) goto truncated; if ((dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dhpk), CBS_len(&dhpk), NULL)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* * Check the strength of the DH key just constructed. * Discard keys weaker than 1024 bits. */ if (DH_size(dh) < 1024 / 8) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); goto err; } if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].x509); else /* XXX - Anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ *pkey = NULL; sc->peer_dh_tmp = dh; return (1); truncated: al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: DH_free(dh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); return (-1); } static int ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, int nid, CBS *public) { EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; int ret = -1; /* Extract the server's ephemeral ECDH public key. */ if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!ssl_kex_peer_public_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, nid, public)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } sc->peer_nid = nid; sc->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh; ecdh = NULL; ret = 1; err: EC_KEY_free(ecdh); return (ret); } static int ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, int nid, CBS *public) { size_t outlen; if (nid != NID_X25519) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (CBS_len(public) != X25519_KEY_LENGTH) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } if (!CBS_stow(public, &sc->peer_x25519_tmp, &outlen)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } return (1); err: return (-1); } static int ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY **pkey, CBS *cbs) { CBS public; uint8_t curve_type; uint16_t curve_id; SESS_CERT *sc; long alg_a; int nid; int al; alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; sc = SSI(s)->sess_cert; /* Only named curves are supported. */ if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type) || curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &curve_id)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } /* * Check that the curve is one of our preferences - if it is not, * the server has sent us an invalid curve. */ if (tls1_check_curve(s, curve_id) != 1) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); goto f_err; } if ((nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(curve_id)) == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &public)) goto truncated; if (nid == NID_X25519) { if (ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, sc, nid, &public) != 1) goto err; } else { if (ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, sc, nid, &public) != 1) goto err; } /* * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA * and ECDSA. */ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].x509); else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); else /* XXX - Anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ *pkey = NULL; return (1); truncated: al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { CBS cbs, signature; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; const unsigned char *param; long n, alg_k, alg_a; int al, ok; size_t param_len; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; /* * Use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped. */ n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (n < 0) goto err; CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { /* * Do not skip server key exchange if this cipher suite uses * ephemeral keys. */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return (1); } if (SSI(s)->sess_cert != NULL) { DH_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp); SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL; EC_KEY_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp); SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL; free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_x25519_tmp); SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_x25519_tmp = NULL; } else { SSI(s)->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL) goto err; } param = CBS_data(&cbs); param_len = CBS_len(&cbs); if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { if (ssl3_get_server_kex_dhe(s, &pkey, &cbs) != 1) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { if (ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &pkey, &cbs) != 1) goto err; } else if (alg_k != 0) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } param_len -= CBS_len(&cbs); /* if it was signed, check the signature */ if (pkey != NULL) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { uint16_t sigalg_value; if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &sigalg_value)) goto truncated; if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg(sigalg_value, tls12_sigalgs, tls12_sigalgs_len)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } if ((md = sigalg->md()) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (!ssl_sigalg_pkey_ok(sigalg, pkey, 0)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { sigalg = ssl_sigalg_lookup(SIGALG_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1); } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { sigalg = ssl_sigalg_lookup(SIGALG_ECDSA_SHA1); } else { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } md = sigalg->md(); if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature)) goto truncated; if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) goto err; if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) && (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len)) goto err; if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature)) <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else { /* aNULL does not need public keys. */ if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return (1); truncated: al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return (-1); } int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) { int ok, ret = 0; long n; uint8_t ctype_num; CBS cert_request, ctypes, rdn_list; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; const unsigned char *q; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req = 0; if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; /* * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records * as we wont be doing client auth. */ tls1_transcript_free(s); return (1); } if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto err; } /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER); goto err; } if (n < 0) goto truncated; CBS_init(&cert_request, s->internal->init_msg, n); if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* get the certificate types */ if (!CBS_get_u8(&cert_request, &ctype_num)) goto truncated; if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER; if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cert_request, &ctypes, ctype_num) || !CBS_write_bytes(&ctypes, (uint8_t *)S3I(s)->tmp.ctype, sizeof(S3I(s)->tmp.ctype), NULL)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { CBS sigalgs; if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (CBS_len(&sigalgs) % 2 != 0 || CBS_len(&sigalgs) > 64) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); goto err; } if (!CBS_stow(&sigalgs, &S3I(s)->hs.sigalgs, &S3I(s)->hs.sigalgs_len)) goto err; } /* get the CA RDNs */ if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &rdn_list) || CBS_len(&cert_request) != 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } while (CBS_len(&rdn_list) > 0) { CBS rdn; if (CBS_len(&rdn_list) < 2) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&rdn_list, &rdn)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); goto err; } q = CBS_data(&rdn); if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&rdn))) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (q != CBS_data(&rdn) + CBS_len(&rdn)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } xn = NULL; /* avoid free in err block */ } /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req = 1; S3I(s)->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num; sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(S3I(s)->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); S3I(s)->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; ca_sk = NULL; ret = 1; if (0) { truncated: SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); } err: X509_NAME_free(xn); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); return (ret); } static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b) { return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); } int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) { int ok, al, ret = 0; uint32_t lifetime_hint; long n; CBS cbs, session_ticket; n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, -1, 16384, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; return (1); } if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (n < 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n); if (!CBS_get_u32(&cbs, &lifetime_hint) || #if UINT32_MAX > LONG_MAX lifetime_hint > LONG_MAX || #endif !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_ticket) || CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = (long)lifetime_hint; if (!CBS_stow(&session_ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick, &s->session->tlsext_ticklen)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion. * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal * client session ID matching to work and we know much * earlier that the ticket has been accepted. * * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine * session resumption. * * We choose the former approach because this fits in with * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the * ticket. */ EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&session_ticket), CBS_len(&session_ticket), s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL); ret = 1; return (ret); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: return (-1); } int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) { CBS cert_status, response; int ok, al; long n; uint8_t status_type; n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (n < 0) { /* need at least status type + length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } CBS_init(&cert_status, s->internal->init_msg, n); if (!CBS_get_u8(&cert_status, &status_type) || CBS_len(&cert_status) < 3) { /* need at least status type + length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_status, &response) || CBS_len(&cert_status) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!CBS_stow(&response, &s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp, &s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp_len)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } if (s->ctx->internal->tlsext_status_cb) { int ret; ret = s->ctx->internal->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->internal->tlsext_status_arg); if (ret == 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); goto f_err; } if (ret < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } } return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return (-1); } int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) { int ok, ret = 0; long n; n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); if (n > 0) { /* should contain no data */ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return (-1); } ret = 1; return (ret); } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, CBB *cbb) { unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char *enc_pms = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int ret = -1; int enc_len; CBB epms; /* * RSA-Encrypted Premaster Secret Message - RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1. */ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].x509); if (pkey == NULL || pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA || pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; arc4random_buf(&pms[2], sizeof(pms) - 2); if ((enc_pms = malloc(RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa))) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } enc_len = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof(pms), pms, enc_pms, pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); if (enc_len <= 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &epms)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&epms, enc_pms, enc_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) goto err; s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, pms, sizeof(pms)); ret = 1; err: explicit_bzero(pms, sizeof(pms)); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); free(enc_pms); return (ret); } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, CBB *cbb) { DH *dh_srvr = NULL, *dh_clnt = NULL; unsigned char *key = NULL; int key_size = 0, key_len; unsigned char *data; int ret = -1; CBB dh_Yc; /* Ensure that we have an ephemeral key for DHE. */ if (sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS); goto err; } dh_srvr = sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; /* Generate a new random key. */ if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if ((key_size = DH_size(dh_clnt)) <= 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if ((key = malloc(key_size)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((key_len = DH_compute_key(key, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt)) <= 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } /* Generate master key from the result. */ s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, key, key_len); if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_Yc)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_Yc, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key))) goto err; BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, data); if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) goto err; ret = 1; err: DH_free(dh_clnt); freezero(key, key_size); return (ret); } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, CBB *cbb) { EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; uint8_t *key = NULL; size_t key_len = 0; int ret = -1; CBB ecpoint; if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!ssl_kex_generate_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, sc->peer_nid)) goto err; /* Encode our public key. */ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) goto err; if (!ssl_kex_public_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, &ecpoint)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) goto err; if (!ssl_kex_derive_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, sc->peer_ecdh_tmp, &key, &key_len)) goto err; s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, key, key_len); ret = 1; err: freezero(key, key_len); EC_KEY_free(ecdh); return (ret); } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, CBB *cbb) { uint8_t *public_key = NULL, *private_key = NULL, *shared_key = NULL; int ret = -1; CBB ecpoint; /* Generate X25519 key pair and derive shared key. */ if ((public_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) goto err; if ((private_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) goto err; if ((shared_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL) goto err; X25519_keypair(public_key, private_key); if (!X25519(shared_key, private_key, sc->peer_x25519_tmp)) goto err; /* Serialize the public key. */ if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ecpoint, public_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) goto err; /* Generate master key from the result. */ s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); ret = 1; err: free(public_key); freezero(private_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); freezero(shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH); return (ret); } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, CBB *cbb) { if (sc->peer_x25519_tmp != NULL) { if (ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, sc, cbb) != 1) goto err; } else if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) { if (ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, sc, cbb) != 1) goto err; } else { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } return (1); err: return (-1); } static int ssl3_send_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, CBB *cbb) { unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; EVP_PKEY *pub_key = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; X509 *peer_cert; size_t msglen; unsigned int md_len; EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash; int ret = -1; int nid; CBB gostblob; /* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */ peer_cert = sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].x509; if (peer_cert == NULL) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); goto err; } pub_key = X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert); pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key, NULL); /* * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key parameters match * those of server certificate, use certificate key for key exchange. * Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair. */ EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx); /* Generate session key. */ arc4random_buf(premaster_secret, 32); /* * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key. */ if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) { if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) { /* * If there was an error - just ignore it. * Ephemeral key would be used. */ ERR_clear_error(); } } /* * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context data. */ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ukm_hash == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (ssl_get_algorithm2(s) & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94) nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; else nid = NID_id_tc26_gost3411_2012_256; if (!EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) goto err; EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } /* * Make GOST keytransport blob message, encapsulate it into sequence. */ msglen = 255; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32) < 0) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &gostblob, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&gostblob, tmp, msglen)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cbb)) goto err; /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used. */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) { /* Set flag "skip certificate verify". */ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32); ret = 1; err: explicit_bzero(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key); return (ret); } int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { SESS_CERT *sess_cert; unsigned long alg_k; CBB cbb, kex; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) { alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; if ((sess_cert = SSI(s)->sess_cert) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &kex, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) goto err; if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { if (ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(s, sess_cert, &kex) != 1) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { if (ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(s, sess_cert, &kex) != 1) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { if (ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe(s, sess_cert, &kex) != 1) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { if (ssl3_send_client_kex_gost(s, sess_cert, &kex) != 1) goto err; } else { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) goto err; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return (-1); } static int ssl3_send_client_verify_sigalgs(SSL *s, CBB *cert_verify) { const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg; CBB cbb_signature; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; const EVP_MD *md; const unsigned char *hdata; unsigned char *signature = NULL; size_t signature_len, hdata_len; int ret = 0; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg_select(s, pkey)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); goto err; } if ((md = sigalg->md()) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); goto err; } if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdata_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (sigalg->key_type == EVP_PKEY_GOSTR01 && EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, NULL) <= 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) && (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdata_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, NULL, &signature_len) || signature_len == 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, signature, &signature_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16(cert_verify, sigalg->value)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify)) goto err; ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); free(signature); return ret; } static int ssl3_send_client_verify_rsa(SSL *s, CBB *cert_verify) { CBB cbb_signature; EVP_PKEY *pkey; unsigned char data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *signature = NULL; unsigned int signature_len; size_t data_len; int ret = 0; pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, data, sizeof(data), &data_len)) goto err; if ((signature = calloc(1, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey))) == NULL) goto err; if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, data_len, signature, &signature_len, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 ) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify)) goto err; ret = 1; err: free(signature); return ret; } static int ssl3_send_client_verify_ec(SSL *s, CBB *cert_verify) { CBB cbb_signature; EVP_PKEY *pkey; unsigned char data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *signature = NULL; unsigned int signature_len; int ret = 0; pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, data, sizeof(data), NULL)) goto err; if ((signature = calloc(1, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey))) == NULL) goto err; if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, &data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, signature, &signature_len, pkey->pkey.ec)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify)) goto err; ret = 1; err: free(signature); return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST static int ssl3_send_client_verify_gost(SSL *s, CBB *cert_verify) { CBB cbb_signature; EVP_MD_CTX mctx; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; EVP_PKEY *pkey; const EVP_MD *md; const unsigned char *hdata; unsigned char *signature = NULL; size_t signature_len; size_t hdata_len; int nid; int ret = 0; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdata_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) || (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, NULL) <= 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdata_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, NULL, &signature_len) || signature_len == 0) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, signature, &signature_len)) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature)) goto err; if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len)) goto err; if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify)) goto err; ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); free(signature); return ret; } #endif int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) { CBB cbb, cert_verify; EVP_PKEY *pkey; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &cert_verify, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) goto err; pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; /* * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature * using agreed digest and cached handshake records. */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_sigalgs(s, &cert_verify)) goto err; } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_rsa(s, &cert_verify)) goto err; } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_ec(s, &cert_verify)) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST } else if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_gost(s, &cert_verify)) goto err; #endif } else { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } tls1_transcript_free(s); if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) goto err; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; } return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return (-1); } int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; X509 *x509 = NULL; CBB cbb, client_cert; int i; memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb)); if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { if (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL || s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; else S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; } /* We need to get a client cert */ if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { /* * If we get an error, we need to * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); * We then get retied later */ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); if (i < 0) { s->internal->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return (-1); } s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) i = 0; } else if (i == 1) { i = 0; SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); } X509_free(x509); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (i == 0) { S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req = 2; /* There is no client certificate to verify. */ tls1_transcript_free(s); } /* Ok, we have a cert */ S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; } if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) { if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &client_cert, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)) goto err; if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &client_cert, (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) goto err; if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb)) goto err; S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ return (ssl3_handshake_write(s)); err: CBB_cleanup(&cbb); return (0); } #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) { int i, idx; long alg_k, alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; SESS_CERT *sc; DH *dh; alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; /* We don't have a certificate. */ if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) return (1); sc = SSI(s)->sess_cert; if (sc == NULL) { SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } dh = SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; /* This is the passed certificate. */ idx = sc->peer_cert_type; if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) { if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg( sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) { /* check failed */ SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); goto f_err; } else { return (1); } } pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one. */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; } if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC)) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); goto f_err; } if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) { SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } return (1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); err: return (0); } /* * Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure. */ int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) { int ok; long n; /* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) return (1); /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate * message, so permit appropriate message length */ n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return ((int)n); S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1; if ((S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) || (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) return (2); return (1); } int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { int i = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (s->ctx->internal->client_cert_engine) { i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert( s->ctx->internal->client_cert_engine, s, SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (i != 0) return (i); } #endif if (s->ctx->internal->client_cert_cb) i = s->ctx->internal->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); return (i); }