hdkv
/
yuzu
1
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases 1 Activity
yuzu/externals/libressl/ssl/ssl_clnt.c

2769 lines
69 KiB
C
Executable File
Raw Blame History

/* $OpenBSD: ssl_clnt.c,v 1.73 2020/09/24 18:12:00 jsing Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
#include <openssl/gost.h>
#endif
#include "bytestring.h"
#include "ssl_sigalgs.h"
#include "ssl_tlsext.h"
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
int
ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
int ret = -1;
int new_state, state, skip = 0;
ERR_clear_error();
errno = 0;
if (s->internal->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->internal->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->internal->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->internal->info_callback;
s->internal->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
SSL_clear(s);
for (;;) {
state = S3I(s)->hs.state;
switch (S3I(s)->hs.state) {
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->internal->renegotiate = 1;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
/* break */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
s->server = 0;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
} else {
if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
}
/* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
s->internal->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_connect++;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* mark client_random uninitialized */
memset(s->s3->client_random, 0,
sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
D1I(s)->send_cookie = 0;
s->internal->hit = 0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
s->internal->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
tls1_transcript_reset(s);
dtls1_start_timer(s);
}
ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && D1I(s)->send_cookie) {
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
} else
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->internal->hit) {
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
/* receive renewed session ticket */
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
}
/* No client certificate verification. */
tls1_transcript_free(s);
}
} else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
S3I(s)->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
} else {
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
}
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (D1I(s)->send_cookie) /* start again, with a cookie */
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
else
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2) {
s->internal->hit = 1;
if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
}
/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH. */
if (!(S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
SSL_aNULL)) {
ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->internal->tlsext_status_expected)
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
} else {
skip = 1;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
/*
* At this point we check that we have the
* required stuff from the server.
*/
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req)
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
else
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
/*
* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
* sent back
*/
/*
* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
* of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent
*/
/*
* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
* ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
* We need to skip the certificate verify
* message when client's ECDH public key is sent
* inside the client certificate.
*/
if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
} else {
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 0;
}
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 0;
}
}
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
S3I(s)->change_cipher_spec = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->internal->hit)
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
s->session->cipher = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher;
if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->internal->hit)
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
/* clear flags */
if (s->internal->hit) {
S3I(s)->hs.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
} else {
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
if (s->internal->tlsext_ticket_expected)
S3I(s)->hs.next_state =
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
S3I(s)->hs.next_state =
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
}
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
D1I(s)->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
else
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (s->internal->hit)
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
else
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK;
s->internal->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* If the write error was fatal, stop trying */
if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) {
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state;
}
}
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
S3I(s)->hs.state = S3I(s)->hs.next_state;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
tls1_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (S3I(s)->handshake_transcript != NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
ssl3_release_init_buffer(s);
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->internal->init_num = 0;
s->internal->renegotiate = 0;
s->internal->new_session = 0;
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->internal->hit)
s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_hit++;
ret = 1;
/* s->server=0; */
s->internal->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
s->ctx->internal->stats.sess_connect_good++;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* done with handshaking */
D1I(s)->handshake_read_seq = 0;
D1I(s)->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
}
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
/* did we do anything */
if (!S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
if (s->internal->debug) {
if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (S3I(s)->hs.state != state)) {
new_state = S3I(s)->hs.state;
S3I(s)->hs.state = state;
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
S3I(s)->hs.state = new_state;
}
}
skip = 0;
}
end:
s->internal->in_handshake--;
if (cb != NULL)
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
return (ret);
}
int
ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb, client_hello, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites;
CBB compression_methods;
uint16_t max_version;
size_t sl;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
if (ssl_supported_version_range(s, NULL, &max_version) != 1) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
return (-1);
}
s->client_version = s->version = max_version;
if (sess == NULL ||
sess->ssl_version != s->version ||
(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
sess->internal->not_resumable) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
goto err;
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
/*
* If a DTLS ClientHello message is being resent after a
* HelloVerifyRequest, we must retain the original client
* random value.
*/
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || D1I(s)->send_cookie == 0)
arc4random_buf(s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &client_hello,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO))
goto err;
/*
* Version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
* 1.0.
*
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
* 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
* containing version 1.0.
*
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*/
if (!CBB_add_u16(&client_hello, s->client_version))
goto err;
/* Random stuff */
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&client_hello, s->s3->client_random,
sizeof(s->s3->client_random)))
goto err;
/* Session ID */
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id))
goto err;
if (!s->internal->new_session &&
s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id,
s->session->session_id, sl))
goto err;
}
/* DTLS Cookie. */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (D1I(s)->cookie_len > sizeof(D1I(s)->cookie)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cookie, D1I(s)->cookie,
D1I(s)->cookie_len))
goto err;
}
/* Ciphers supported */
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites))
return 0;
if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s),
&cipher_suites)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
goto err;
}
/* Add in compression methods (null) */
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello,
&compression_methods))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u8(&compression_methods, 0))
goto err;
/* TLS extensions */
if (!tlsext_client_build(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_CH, &client_hello)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (-1);
}
int
ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
CBS cbs, server_random, session_id;
uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite;
uint16_t min_version, max_version;
uint8_t compression_method;
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
const SSL_METHOD *method;
unsigned long alg_k;
size_t outlen;
int al, ok;
long n;
s->internal->first_packet = 1;
n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, /* ?? */ &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->internal->first_packet = 0;
if (n < 0)
goto truncated;
CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
if (D1I(s)->send_cookie == 0) {
S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
} else {
/* Already sent a cookie. */
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &server_version))
goto truncated;
if (ssl_supported_version_range(s, &min_version, &max_version) != 1) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
goto err;
}
if (server_version < min_version || server_version > max_version) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | (server_version & 0xff);
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->version = server_version;
if ((method = ssl_get_client_method(server_version)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->method = method;
/* Server random. */
if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
goto truncated;
if (!CBS_write_bytes(&server_random, s->s3->server_random,
sizeof(s->s3->server_random), NULL))
goto err;
if (!ssl_downgrade_max_version(s, &max_version))
goto err;
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && max_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
s->version < max_version) {
/*
* RFC 8446 section 4.1.3. We must not downgrade if the server
* random value contains the TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.1 magical value.
*/
if (!CBS_skip(&server_random,
CBS_len(&server_random) - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12)))
goto err;
if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION &&
CBS_mem_equal(&server_random, tls13_downgrade_12,
sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12))) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
goto f_err;
}
if (CBS_mem_equal(&server_random, tls13_downgrade_11,
sizeof(tls13_downgrade_11))) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* Session ID. */
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id))
goto truncated;
if (CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
/* Cipher suite. */
if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &cipher_suite))
goto truncated;
/*
* Check if we want to resume the session based on external
* pre-shared secret.
*/
if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length, NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->internal->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher :
ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
}
}
if (s->session->session_id_length != 0 &&
CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, s->session->session_id,
s->session->session_id_length)) {
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length ||
timingsafe_memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,
s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length) != 0) {
/* actually a client application bug */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->internal->hit = 1;
} else {
/* a miss or crap from the other end */
/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
* SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
s->internal->hit = 0;
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
/*
* XXX - improve the handling for the case where there is a
* zero length session identifier.
*/
if (!CBS_write_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id,
sizeof(s->session->session_id), &outlen))
goto err;
s->session->session_id_length = outlen;
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
if ((cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite)) == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later. */
if ((cipher->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
(TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl_cipher_in_list(SSL_get_ciphers(s), cipher)) {
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
* and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
* cipher_id is set and use it for comparison.
*/
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->internal->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != cipher->id)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher = cipher;
if (!tls1_transcript_hash_init(s))
goto err;
/*
* Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for
* client authentication.
*/
alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)))
tls1_transcript_free(s);
if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &compression_method))
goto truncated;
if (compression_method != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
if (!tlsext_client_parse(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_SH, &cbs, &al)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
* avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
* hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
* attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
* which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
* absence on initial connect only.
*/
if (!S3I(s)->renegotiate_seen &&
!(s->internal->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
goto f_err;
}
if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
return (1);
truncated:
/* wrong packet length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return (-1);
}
int
ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
long n;
CBS cbs, cert_list;
X509 *x = NULL;
const unsigned char *q;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (n < 0)
goto truncated;
CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
if (CBS_len(&cbs) < 3)
goto truncated;
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cert_list) ||
CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
while (CBS_len(&cert_list) > 0) {
CBS cert;
if (CBS_len(&cert_list) < 3)
goto truncated;
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_list, &cert)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
q = CBS_data(&cert);
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert));
if (x == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (sc == NULL)
goto err;
ssl_sess_cert_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert);
SSI(s)->sess_cert = sc;
sc->cert_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's
* certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
*/
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
sk = NULL;
/* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
if (i < 0) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
sc->peer_cert_type = i;
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
/*
* Why would the following ever happen?
* We just created sc a couple of lines ago.
*/
X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
X509_free(s->session->peer);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
s->session->peer = x;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x = NULL;
ret = 1;
if (0) {
truncated:
/* wrong packet length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
}
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return (ret);
}
static int
ssl3_get_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY **pkey, CBS *cbs)
{
CBS dhp, dhg, dhpk;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc = NULL;
DH *dh = NULL;
long alg_a;
int al;
alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
sc = SSI(s)->sess_cert;
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &dhp))
goto truncated;
if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dhp), CBS_len(&dhp), NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &dhg))
goto truncated;
if ((dh->g = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dhg), CBS_len(&dhg), NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &dhpk))
goto truncated;
if ((dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dhpk), CBS_len(&dhpk),
NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/*
* Check the strength of the DH key just constructed.
* Discard keys weaker than 1024 bits.
*/
if (DH_size(dh) < 1024 / 8) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
*pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].x509);
else
/* XXX - Anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
*pkey = NULL;
sc->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
return (1);
truncated:
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
DH_free(dh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, int nid, CBS *public)
{
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
int ret = -1;
/* Extract the server's ephemeral ECDH public key. */
if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_kex_peer_public_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, nid, public)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
sc->peer_nid = nid;
sc->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
ecdh = NULL;
ret = 1;
err:
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
return (ret);
}
static int
ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, int nid, CBS *public)
{
size_t outlen;
if (nid != NID_X25519) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (CBS_len(public) != X25519_KEY_LENGTH) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_stow(public, &sc->peer_x25519_tmp, &outlen)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
return (1);
err:
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY **pkey, CBS *cbs)
{
CBS public;
uint8_t curve_type;
uint16_t curve_id;
SESS_CERT *sc;
long alg_a;
int nid;
int al;
alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
sc = SSI(s)->sess_cert;
/* Only named curves are supported. */
if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type) ||
curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE ||
!CBS_get_u16(cbs, &curve_id)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check that the curve is one of our preferences - if it is not,
* the server has sent us an invalid curve.
*/
if (tls1_check_curve(s, curve_id) != 1) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(curve_id)) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &public))
goto truncated;
if (nid == NID_X25519) {
if (ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, sc, nid, &public) != 1)
goto err;
} else {
if (ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, sc, nid, &public) != 1)
goto err;
}
/*
* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
* and ECDSA.
*/
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
*pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].x509);
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
*pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
else
/* XXX - Anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
*pkey = NULL;
return (1);
truncated:
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return (-1);
}
int
ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
CBS cbs, signature;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
const unsigned char *param;
long n, alg_k, alg_a;
int al, ok;
size_t param_len;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/*
* Use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped.
*/
n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (n < 0)
goto err;
CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
/*
* Do not skip server key exchange if this cipher suite uses
* ephemeral keys.
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return (1);
}
if (SSI(s)->sess_cert != NULL) {
DH_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
free(SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_x25519_tmp);
SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_x25519_tmp = NULL;
} else {
SSI(s)->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (SSI(s)->sess_cert == NULL)
goto err;
}
param = CBS_data(&cbs);
param_len = CBS_len(&cbs);
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
if (ssl3_get_server_kex_dhe(s, &pkey, &cbs) != 1)
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
if (ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &pkey, &cbs) != 1)
goto err;
} else if (alg_k != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
param_len -= CBS_len(&cbs);
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
uint16_t sigalg_value;
if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &sigalg_value))
goto truncated;
if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg(sigalg_value, tls12_sigalgs,
tls12_sigalgs_len)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
if ((md = sigalg->md()) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl_sigalg_pkey_ok(sigalg, pkey, 0)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
} else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
sigalg = ssl_sigalg_lookup(SIGALG_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1);
} else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
sigalg = ssl_sigalg_lookup(SIGALG_ECDSA_SHA1);
} else {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
md = sigalg->md();
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature))
goto truncated;
if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->client_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
goto err;
if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) &&
(!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx,
RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1)))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, s->s3->server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len))
goto err;
if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature),
CBS_len(&signature)) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else {
/* aNULL does not need public keys. */
if (!(alg_a & SSL_aNULL)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return (1);
truncated:
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return (-1);
}
int
ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
int ok, ret = 0;
long n;
uint8_t ctype_num;
CBS cert_request, ctypes, rdn_list;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
const unsigned char *q;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req = 0;
if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
/*
* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records
* as we wont be doing client auth.
*/
tls1_transcript_free(s);
return (1);
}
if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if (S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
if (n < 0)
goto truncated;
CBS_init(&cert_request, s->internal->init_msg, n);
if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* get the certificate types */
if (!CBS_get_u8(&cert_request, &ctype_num))
goto truncated;
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER)
ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cert_request, &ctypes, ctype_num) ||
!CBS_write_bytes(&ctypes, (uint8_t *)S3I(s)->tmp.ctype,
sizeof(S3I(s)->tmp.ctype), NULL)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
CBS sigalgs;
if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (CBS_len(&sigalgs) % 2 != 0 || CBS_len(&sigalgs) > 64) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_stow(&sigalgs, &S3I(s)->hs.sigalgs,
&S3I(s)->hs.sigalgs_len))
goto err;
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &rdn_list) ||
CBS_len(&cert_request) != 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
while (CBS_len(&rdn_list) > 0) {
CBS rdn;
if (CBS_len(&rdn_list) < 2) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&rdn_list, &rdn)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
q = CBS_data(&rdn);
if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&rdn))) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (q != CBS_data(&rdn) + CBS_len(&rdn)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
xn = NULL; /* avoid free in err block */
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req = 1;
S3I(s)->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(S3I(s)->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
S3I(s)->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
ca_sk = NULL;
ret = 1;
if (0) {
truncated:
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
}
err:
X509_NAME_free(xn);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return (ret);
}
static int
ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
{
return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
}
int
ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al, ret = 0;
uint32_t lifetime_hint;
long n;
CBS cbs, session_ticket;
n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, -1, 16384, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
if (S3I(s)->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (n < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
CBS_init(&cbs, s->internal->init_msg, n);
if (!CBS_get_u32(&cbs, &lifetime_hint) ||
#if UINT32_MAX > LONG_MAX
lifetime_hint > LONG_MAX ||
#endif
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_ticket) ||
CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = (long)lifetime_hint;
if (!CBS_stow(&session_ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick,
&s->session->tlsext_ticklen)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion.
* One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
* must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
* client session ID matching to work and we know much
* earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
*
* The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
* ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
* session resumption.
*
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with
* assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
* to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the
* ticket.
*/
EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&session_ticket), CBS_len(&session_ticket),
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
ret = 1;
return (ret);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return (-1);
}
int
ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
CBS cert_status, response;
int ok, al;
long n;
uint8_t status_type;
n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS,
16384, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (n < 0) {
/* need at least status type + length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
CBS_init(&cert_status, s->internal->init_msg, n);
if (!CBS_get_u8(&cert_status, &status_type) ||
CBS_len(&cert_status) < 3) {
/* need at least status type + length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_status, &response) ||
CBS_len(&cert_status) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!CBS_stow(&response, &s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
&s->internal->tlsext_ocsp_resp_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->ctx->internal->tlsext_status_cb) {
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->internal->tlsext_status_cb(s,
s->ctx->internal->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
goto f_err;
}
if (ret < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return (-1);
}
int
ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
{
int ok, ret = 0;
long n;
n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (n > 0) {
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return (-1);
}
ret = 1;
return (ret);
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, CBB *cbb)
{
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char *enc_pms = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int ret = -1;
int enc_len;
CBB epms;
/*
* RSA-Encrypted Premaster Secret Message - RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1.
*/
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].x509);
if (pkey == NULL || pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
arc4random_buf(&pms[2], sizeof(pms) - 2);
if ((enc_pms = malloc(RSA_size(pkey->pkey.rsa))) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
enc_len = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof(pms), pms, enc_pms, pkey->pkey.rsa,
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (enc_len <= 0) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &epms))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&epms, enc_pms, enc_len))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
goto err;
s->session->master_key_length =
tls1_generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, pms, sizeof(pms));
ret = 1;
err:
explicit_bzero(pms, sizeof(pms));
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
free(enc_pms);
return (ret);
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, CBB *cbb)
{
DH *dh_srvr = NULL, *dh_clnt = NULL;
unsigned char *key = NULL;
int key_size = 0, key_len;
unsigned char *data;
int ret = -1;
CBB dh_Yc;
/* Ensure that we have an ephemeral key for DHE. */
if (sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
goto err;
}
dh_srvr = sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
/* Generate a new random key. */
if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((key_size = DH_size(dh_clnt)) <= 0) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((key = malloc(key_size)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if ((key_len = DH_compute_key(key, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt)) <= 0) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Generate master key from the result. */
s->session->master_key_length =
tls1_generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, key, key_len);
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &dh_Yc))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_space(&dh_Yc, &data, BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key)))
goto err;
BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, data);
if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
DH_free(dh_clnt);
freezero(key, key_size);
return (ret);
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, CBB *cbb)
{
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
uint8_t *key = NULL;
size_t key_len = 0;
int ret = -1;
CBB ecpoint;
if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_kex_generate_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, sc->peer_nid))
goto err;
/* Encode our public key. */
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint))
goto err;
if (!ssl_kex_public_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, &ecpoint))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
goto err;
if (!ssl_kex_derive_ecdhe_ecp(ecdh, sc->peer_ecdh_tmp, &key, &key_len))
goto err;
s->session->master_key_length = tls1_generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, key, key_len);
ret = 1;
err:
freezero(key, key_len);
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
return (ret);
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, CBB *cbb)
{
uint8_t *public_key = NULL, *private_key = NULL, *shared_key = NULL;
int ret = -1;
CBB ecpoint;
/* Generate X25519 key pair and derive shared key. */
if ((public_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((private_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((shared_key = malloc(X25519_KEY_LENGTH)) == NULL)
goto err;
X25519_keypair(public_key, private_key);
if (!X25519(shared_key, private_key, sc->peer_x25519_tmp))
goto err;
/* Serialize the public key. */
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &ecpoint))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&ecpoint, public_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
goto err;
/* Generate master key from the result. */
s->session->master_key_length =
tls1_generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
ret = 1;
err:
free(public_key);
freezero(private_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
freezero(shared_key, X25519_KEY_LENGTH);
return (ret);
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sc, CBB *cbb)
{
if (sc->peer_x25519_tmp != NULL) {
if (ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe_ecx(s, sc, cbb) != 1)
goto err;
} else if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
if (ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe_ecp(s, sc, cbb) != 1)
goto err;
} else {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return (1);
err:
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_kex_gost(SSL *s, SESS_CERT *sess_cert, CBB *cbb)
{
unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
EVP_PKEY *pub_key = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
X509 *peer_cert;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
int ret = -1;
int nid;
CBB gostblob;
/* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
peer_cert = sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].x509;
if (peer_cert == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
goto err;
}
pub_key = X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert);
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key, NULL);
/*
* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key parameters match
* those of server certificate, use certificate key for key exchange.
* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair.
*/
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/* Generate session key. */
arc4random_buf(premaster_secret, 32);
/*
* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key.
*/
if (S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,
s->cert->key->privatekey) <=0) {
/*
* If there was an error - just ignore it.
* Ephemeral key would be used.
*/
ERR_clear_error();
}
}
/*
* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context data.
*/
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ukm_hash == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (ssl_get_algorithm2(s) & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94)
nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
else
nid = NID_id_tc26_gost3411_2012_256;
if (!EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)))
goto err;
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
/*
* Make GOST keytransport blob message, encapsulate it into sequence.
*/
msglen = 255;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret,
32) < 0) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_asn1(cbb, &gostblob, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&gostblob, tmp, msglen))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
goto err;
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used. */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
NULL) > 0) {
/* Set flag "skip certificate verify". */
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
s->session->master_key_length =
tls1_generate_master_secret(s,
s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32);
ret = 1;
err:
explicit_bzero(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret));
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
return (ret);
}
int
ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
SESS_CERT *sess_cert;
unsigned long alg_k;
CBB cbb, kex;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if ((sess_cert = SSI(s)->sess_cert) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &kex,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE))
goto err;
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
if (ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(s, sess_cert, &kex) != 1)
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
if (ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(s, sess_cert, &kex) != 1)
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
if (ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe(s, sess_cert, &kex) != 1)
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
if (ssl3_send_client_kex_gost(s, sess_cert, &kex) != 1)
goto err;
} else {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_verify_sigalgs(SSL *s, CBB *cert_verify)
{
const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg;
CBB cbb_signature;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
const EVP_MD *md;
const unsigned char *hdata;
unsigned char *signature = NULL;
size_t signature_len, hdata_len;
int ret = 0;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg_select(s, pkey)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((md = sigalg->md()) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
goto err;
}
if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdata_len)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (sigalg->key_type == EVP_PKEY_GOSTR01 &&
EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, NULL) <= 0) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) &&
(!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdata_len)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, NULL, &signature_len) ||
signature_len == 0) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, signature, &signature_len)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u16(cert_verify, sigalg->value))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
free(signature);
return ret;
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_verify_rsa(SSL *s, CBB *cert_verify)
{
CBB cbb_signature;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned char data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *signature = NULL;
unsigned int signature_len;
size_t data_len;
int ret = 0;
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, data, sizeof(data), &data_len))
goto err;
if ((signature = calloc(1, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey))) == NULL)
goto err;
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, data_len, signature,
&signature_len, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 ) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
free(signature);
return ret;
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_verify_ec(SSL *s, CBB *cert_verify)
{
CBB cbb_signature;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
unsigned char data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *signature = NULL;
unsigned int signature_len;
int ret = 0;
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, data, sizeof(data), NULL))
goto err;
if ((signature = calloc(1, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey))) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, &data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH],
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, signature, &signature_len, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
free(signature);
return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
static int
ssl3_send_client_verify_gost(SSL *s, CBB *cert_verify)
{
CBB cbb_signature;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
const EVP_MD *md;
const unsigned char *hdata;
unsigned char *signature = NULL;
size_t signature_len;
size_t hdata_len;
int nid;
int ret = 0;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdata_len)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) ||
(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT, GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE, NULL) <= 0) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdata_len)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, NULL, &signature_len) ||
signature_len == 0) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&mctx, signature, &signature_len)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
free(signature);
return ret;
}
#endif
int
ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb, cert_verify;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &cert_verify,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY))
goto err;
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/*
* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature
* using agreed digest and cached handshake records.
*/
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_sigalgs(s, &cert_verify))
goto err;
} else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_rsa(s, &cert_verify))
goto err;
} else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_ec(s, &cert_verify))
goto err;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
} else if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_gost(s, &cert_verify))
goto err;
#endif
} else {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tls1_transcript_free(s);
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
}
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (-1);
}
int
ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
X509 *x509 = NULL;
CBB cbb, client_cert;
int i;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
if (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL ||
s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
else
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
}
/* We need to get a client cert */
if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
/*
* If we get an error, we need to
* ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
* We then get retied later
*/
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
if (i < 0) {
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return (-1);
}
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) ||
!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
i = 0;
} else if (i == 1) {
i = 0;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i == 0) {
S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req = 2;
/* There is no client certificate to verify. */
tls1_transcript_free(s);
}
/* Ok, we have a cert */
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
}
if (S3I(s)->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &client_cert,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE))
goto err;
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &client_cert,
(S3I(s)->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key))
goto err;
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
S3I(s)->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (0);
}
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
int
ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i, idx;
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
SESS_CERT *sc;
DH *dh;
alg_k = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = S3I(s)->hs.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* We don't have a certificate. */
if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL)
return (1);
sc = SSI(s)->sess_cert;
if (sc == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
dh = SSI(s)->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
/* This is the passed certificate. */
idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(
sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
/* check failed */
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto f_err;
} else {
return (1);
}
}
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one. */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) &&
!(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
err:
return (0);
}
/*
* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
* case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
* session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
*/
int
ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
{
int ok;
long n;
/* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
return (1);
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
* message, so permit appropriate message length */
n = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->internal->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
S3I(s)->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
if ((S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
(S3I(s)->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
return (2);
return (1);
}
int
ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
int i = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (s->ctx->internal->client_cert_engine) {
i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(
s->ctx->internal->client_cert_engine, s,
SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (i != 0)
return (i);
}
#endif
if (s->ctx->internal->client_cert_cb)
i = s->ctx->internal->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
return (i);
}
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink