398 lines
10 KiB
C
Executable File
398 lines
10 KiB
C
Executable File
/* $OpenBSD: x509_cmp.c,v 1.35 2019/03/13 20:34:00 tb Exp $ */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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#include <ctype.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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int
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X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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{
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int i;
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X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
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ai = a->cert_info;
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bi = b->cert_info;
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i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
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if (i)
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return (i);
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return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
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unsigned long
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X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
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{
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unsigned long ret = 0;
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EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
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unsigned char md[16];
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char *f;
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
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f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
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if (f == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
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goto err;
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free(f);
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f = NULL;
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if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,
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(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
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(unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
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goto err;
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if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
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goto err;
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ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
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((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
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0xffffffffL;
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err:
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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free(f);
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return (ret);
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}
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#endif
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int
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X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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{
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return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
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}
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int
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X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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{
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return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
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}
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int
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X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
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{
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return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
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int
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X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
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{
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return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
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}
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#endif
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X509_NAME *
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X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
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{
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return (a->cert_info->issuer);
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}
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unsigned long
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X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
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{
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return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
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unsigned long
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X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
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{
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return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
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}
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#endif
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X509_NAME *
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X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
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{
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return (a->cert_info->subject);
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}
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ASN1_INTEGER *
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X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
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{
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return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
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}
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const ASN1_INTEGER *
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X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
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{
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return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
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}
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unsigned long
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X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
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{
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return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
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unsigned long
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X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
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{
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return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
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}
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#endif
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
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/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
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* this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
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* prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
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* STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
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* involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
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* certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
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* where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
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* with an evil cast.
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*/
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int
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X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
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{
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/* ensure hash is valid */
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X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
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X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
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return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
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}
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#endif
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int
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X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
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{
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int ret;
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/* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
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if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
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ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
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if (ret < 0)
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return -2;
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}
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if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
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ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
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if (ret < 0)
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return -2;
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}
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ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
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}
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unsigned long
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X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
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{
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unsigned long ret = 0;
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unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
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i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
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if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
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NULL))
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return 0;
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ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
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((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
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0xffffffffL;
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return (ret);
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}
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
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/* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
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* this is reasonably efficient. */
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unsigned long
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X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
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{
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EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
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unsigned long ret = 0;
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unsigned char md[16];
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/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
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i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
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if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) &&
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EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) &&
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EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
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ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) |
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((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
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((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) |
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((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
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0xffffffffL;
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
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return (ret);
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}
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#endif
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/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
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X509 *
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X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
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ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
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{
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int i;
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X509_CINF cinf;
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X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
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if (!sk)
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return NULL;
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x.cert_info = &cinf;
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cinf.serialNumber = serial;
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cinf.issuer = name;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
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x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
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if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
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return (x509);
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}
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return (NULL);
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}
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X509 *
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X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
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{
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X509 *x509;
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
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x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
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if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
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return (x509);
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}
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return (NULL);
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}
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EVP_PKEY *
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X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
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{
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if (x == NULL || x->cert_info == NULL)
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return (NULL);
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return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
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}
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EVP_PKEY *
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X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
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{
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if (x == NULL || x->cert_info == NULL)
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return (NULL);
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return (X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info->key));
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}
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ASN1_BIT_STRING *
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X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
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{
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if (!x)
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return NULL;
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return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
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}
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int
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X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
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{
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const EVP_PKEY *xk;
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int ret;
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xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
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if (xk)
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ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
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else
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ret = -2;
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switch (ret) {
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case 1:
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break;
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case 0:
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X509error(X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
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break;
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case -1:
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X509error(X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
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break;
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case -2:
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X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
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}
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if (ret > 0)
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
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* count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
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* each X509 structure.
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*/
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STACK_OF(X509) *
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X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
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{
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STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
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size_t i;
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ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
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for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++)
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X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i));
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return ret;
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}
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