1299 lines
35 KiB
C
Executable File
1299 lines
35 KiB
C
Executable File
/* $OpenBSD: ssl_pkt.c,v 1.58 2022/03/26 15:05:53 jsing Exp $ */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This package is an SSL implementation written
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* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
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* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
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*
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* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
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* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
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* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
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* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
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* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
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* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
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* the code are not to be removed.
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* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
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* as the author of the parts of the library used.
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* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
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* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
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* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
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* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
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* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
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* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
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* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
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* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
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* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
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* copied and put under another distribution licence
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* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
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*/
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
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* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
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* openssl-core@openssl.org.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
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* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
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* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*
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* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
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* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
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* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
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*
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*/
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include "bytestring.h"
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#include "dtls_locl.h"
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#include "ssl_locl.h"
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static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
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unsigned int len);
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static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
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/*
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* Force a WANT_READ return for certain error conditions where
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* we don't want to spin internally.
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*/
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void
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ssl_force_want_read(SSL *s)
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{
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BIO *bio;
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bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
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BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
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BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
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s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING;
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}
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/*
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* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
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* packet by another n bytes.
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* The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
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* by s->internal->packet and s->internal->packet_length.
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* (If s->internal->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
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* [plus s->internal->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
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*/
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static int
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ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
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{
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SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL *rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
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int i, len, left;
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size_t align;
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unsigned char *pkt;
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if (n <= 0)
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return n;
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if (rb->buf == NULL)
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if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
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return -1;
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left = rb->left;
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align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
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align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
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if (!extend) {
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/* start with empty packet ... */
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if (left == 0)
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rb->offset = align;
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else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
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/* check if next packet length is large
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* enough to justify payload alignment... */
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pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
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if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
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(pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) {
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/* Note that even if packet is corrupted
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* and its length field is insane, we can
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* only be led to wrong decision about
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* whether memmove will occur or not.
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* Header values has no effect on memmove
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* arguments and therefore no buffer
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* overrun can be triggered. */
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memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
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rb->offset = align;
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}
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}
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s->internal->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
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s->internal->packet_length = 0;
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/* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
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}
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/* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
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* because the read operation returns the whole packet
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* at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
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if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
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if (left > 0 && n > left)
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n = left;
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}
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/* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
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if (left >= n) {
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s->internal->packet_length += n;
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rb->left = left - n;
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rb->offset += n;
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return (n);
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}
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/* else we need to read more data */
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len = s->internal->packet_length;
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pkt = rb->buf + align;
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/* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
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* 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
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* 'left' extra ones at the end */
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if (s->internal->packet != pkt) {
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/* len > 0 */
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memmove(pkt, s->internal->packet, len + left);
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s->internal->packet = pkt;
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rb->offset = len + align;
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}
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if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) {
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/* does not happen */
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SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return -1;
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}
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if (s->internal->read_ahead || SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
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if (max < n)
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max = n;
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if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
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max = rb->len - rb->offset;
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} else {
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/* ignore max parameter */
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max = n;
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}
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while (left < n) {
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/* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
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* and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
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* len+max if possible) */
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errno = 0;
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if (s->rbio != NULL) {
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s->internal->rwstate = SSL_READING;
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i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
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} else {
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SSLerror(s, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
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i = -1;
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}
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if (i <= 0) {
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rb->left = left;
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if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
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!SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
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if (len + left == 0)
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ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
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}
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return (i);
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}
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left += i;
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/*
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* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
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* the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as
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* opposed to byte oriented as in the TLS case.
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*/
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if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
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if (n > left)
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n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
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}
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}
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/* done reading, now the book-keeping */
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rb->offset += n;
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rb->left = left - n;
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s->internal->packet_length += n;
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s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
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return (n);
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}
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int
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ssl3_packet_read(SSL *s, int plen)
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{
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int n;
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n = ssl3_read_n(s, plen, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
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if (n <= 0)
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return n;
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if (s->internal->packet_length < plen)
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return s->internal->packet_length;
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return plen;
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}
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int
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ssl3_packet_extend(SSL *s, int plen)
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{
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int rlen, n;
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if (s->internal->packet_length >= plen)
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return plen;
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rlen = plen - s->internal->packet_length;
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n = ssl3_read_n(s, rlen, rlen, 1);
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if (n <= 0)
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return n;
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if (s->internal->packet_length < plen)
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return s->internal->packet_length;
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return plen;
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}
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/* Call this to get a new input record.
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* It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
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* or non-blocking IO.
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* When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
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* ssl->s3->internal->rrec.type - is the type of record
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* ssl->s3->internal->rrec.data, - data
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* ssl->s3->internal->rrec.length, - number of bytes
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*/
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/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
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static int
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ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
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{
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SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL *rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
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SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
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uint8_t alert_desc;
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uint8_t *out;
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size_t out_len;
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int al, n;
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int ret = -1;
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again:
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/* check if we have the header */
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if ((s->internal->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
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(s->internal->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
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CBS header;
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uint16_t len, ssl_version;
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uint8_t type;
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n = ssl3_packet_read(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
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if (n <= 0)
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return (n);
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s->internal->mac_packet = 1;
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s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
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if (s->server && s->internal->first_packet) {
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if ((ret = ssl_server_legacy_first_packet(s)) != 1)
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return (ret);
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ret = -1;
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}
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|
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CBS_init(&header, s->internal->packet, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
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|
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/* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL */
|
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if (!CBS_get_u8(&header, &type) ||
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!CBS_get_u16(&header, &ssl_version) ||
|
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!CBS_get_u16(&header, &len)) {
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SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
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goto err;
|
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}
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rr->type = type;
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rr->length = len;
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|
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/* Lets check version */
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if (!s->internal->first_packet && ssl_version != s->version) {
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if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (ssl_version & 0xFF00) &&
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!tls12_record_layer_write_protected(s->internal->rl)) {
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/* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
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s->version = ssl_version;
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}
|
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SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
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al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
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goto fatal_err;
|
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}
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|
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if ((ssl_version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
|
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SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
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goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
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if (rr->length > rb->len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
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al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
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SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
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goto fatal_err;
|
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}
|
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}
|
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|
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n = ssl3_packet_extend(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length);
|
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if (n <= 0)
|
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return (n);
|
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if (n != SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length)
|
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return (n);
|
|
|
|
s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* A full record has now been read from the wire, which now needs
|
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* to be processed.
|
|
*/
|
|
tls12_record_layer_set_version(s->internal->rl, s->version);
|
|
|
|
if (!tls12_record_layer_open_record(s->internal->rl, s->internal->packet,
|
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s->internal->packet_length, &out, &out_len)) {
|
|
tls12_record_layer_alert(s->internal->rl, &alert_desc);
|
|
|
|
if (alert_desc == 0)
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (alert_desc == SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW)
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
|
else if (alert_desc == SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC)
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
|
|
|
|
al = alert_desc;
|
|
goto fatal_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rr->data = out;
|
|
rr->length = out_len;
|
|
rr->off = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
|
|
s->internal->packet_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length == 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Zero-length fragments are only permitted for application
|
|
* data, as per RFC 5246 section 6.2.1.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
|
|
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
|
|
goto fatal_err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* CBC countermeasures for known IV weaknesses can legitimately
|
|
* insert a single empty record, so we allow ourselves to read
|
|
* once past a single empty record without forcing want_read.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->internal->empty_record_count++ > SSL_MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_BEHAVING_BADLY);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->internal->empty_record_count > 1) {
|
|
ssl_force_want_read(s);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
goto again;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->internal->empty_record_count = 0;
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
|
|
fatal_err:
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
|
|
err:
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
|
|
* It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
|
|
unsigned int tot, n, nw;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (len < 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
tot = s->s3->wnum;
|
|
s->s3->wnum = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->internal->in_handshake) {
|
|
i = s->internal->handshake_func(s);
|
|
if (i < 0)
|
|
return (i);
|
|
if (i == 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len < tot)
|
|
len = tot;
|
|
n = (len - tot);
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
|
|
nw = s->max_send_fragment;
|
|
else
|
|
nw = n;
|
|
|
|
i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw);
|
|
if (i <= 0) {
|
|
s->s3->wnum = tot;
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
|
|
(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Next chunk of data should get another prepended
|
|
* empty fragment in ciphersuites with known-IV
|
|
* weakness.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
|
|
|
|
return tot + i;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
n -= i;
|
|
tot += i;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
|
|
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
|
|
int need_empty_fragment = 0;
|
|
size_t align, out_len;
|
|
uint16_t version;
|
|
CBB cbb;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
|
|
|
|
if (wb->buf == NULL)
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* First check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL still being written
|
|
* out. This will happen with non blocking IO.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (wb->left != 0)
|
|
return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
|
|
|
|
/* If we have an alert to send, let's send it. */
|
|
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
|
|
if ((ret = ssl3_dispatch_alert(s)) <= 0)
|
|
return (ret);
|
|
/* If it went, fall through and send more stuff. */
|
|
|
|
/* We may have released our buffer, if so get it again. */
|
|
if (wb->buf == NULL)
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256
|
|
* bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0.
|
|
*/
|
|
version = s->version;
|
|
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B &&
|
|
!s->internal->renegotiate &&
|
|
s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version > TLS1_VERSION)
|
|
version = TLS1_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
|
|
* (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). Note that this
|
|
* is unnecessary for AEAD.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sess != NULL && tls12_record_layer_write_protected(s->internal->rl)) {
|
|
if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments &&
|
|
!s->s3->empty_fragment_done &&
|
|
type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
|
|
need_empty_fragment = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* An extra fragment would be a couple of cipher blocks, which would
|
|
* be a multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
|
|
* payload, then we can just simply pretend we have two headers.
|
|
*/
|
|
align = (size_t)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
if (need_empty_fragment)
|
|
align += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
|
|
align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
|
|
wb->offset = align;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, wb->buf + align, wb->len - align))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
tls12_record_layer_set_version(s->internal->rl, version);
|
|
|
|
if (need_empty_fragment) {
|
|
if (!tls12_record_layer_seal_record(s->internal->rl, type,
|
|
buf, 0, &cbb))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls12_record_layer_seal_record(s->internal->rl, type, buf, len, &cbb))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &out_len))
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
wb->left = out_len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect
|
|
* bad write retries later.
|
|
*/
|
|
s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_type = type;
|
|
s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
|
|
|
|
/* We now just need to write the buffer. */
|
|
return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
|
|
int
|
|
ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
SSL3_BUFFER_INTERNAL *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
|
|
|
|
/* XXXX */
|
|
if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
|
|
!(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) ||
|
|
(s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
|
|
return (-1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
errno = 0;
|
|
if (s->wbio != NULL) {
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
|
|
i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
|
|
(unsigned int)wb->left);
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
|
|
i = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (i == wb->left) {
|
|
wb->left = 0;
|
|
wb->offset += i;
|
|
if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
|
|
!SSL_is_dtls(s))
|
|
ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
|
|
} else if (i <= 0) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the
|
|
* whole point in using a datagram service.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
|
|
wb->left = 0;
|
|
return (i);
|
|
}
|
|
wb->offset += i;
|
|
wb->left -= i;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
ssl3_read_alert(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr = &s->s3->rrec;
|
|
uint8_t alert_level, alert_descr;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* TLSv1.2 permits an alert to be fragmented across multiple records or
|
|
* for multiple alerts to be be coalesced into a single alert record.
|
|
* In the case of DTLS, there is no way to reassemble an alert
|
|
* fragmented across multiple records, hence a full alert must be
|
|
* available in the record.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (rr->length > 0 &&
|
|
s->s3->alert_fragment_len < sizeof(s->s3->alert_fragment)) {
|
|
s->s3->alert_fragment[s->s3->alert_fragment_len++] =
|
|
rr->data[rr->off++];
|
|
rr->length--;
|
|
}
|
|
if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len < sizeof(s->s3->alert_fragment)) {
|
|
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_msg_callback(s, 0, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2);
|
|
|
|
alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
|
|
alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
|
|
s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT,
|
|
(alert_level << 8) | alert_descr);
|
|
|
|
if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
|
|
s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
|
|
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
|
|
s->internal->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* We requested renegotiation and the peer rejected it. */
|
|
if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
|
|
ERR_asprintf_error_data("SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
|
|
s->internal->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
ssl3_read_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr = &s->s3->rrec;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly what
|
|
* the record payload has to look like.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rr->length != 1 || rr->off != 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
|
|
|
|
ssl_msg_callback(s, 0, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Check that we have a cipher to change to. */
|
|
if (s->s3->hs.cipher == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that we should be receiving a Change Cipher Spec. */
|
|
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
|
|
if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* We can't process a CCS now, because previous
|
|
* handshake messages are still missing, so just
|
|
* drop it.
|
|
*/
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if ((s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK) == 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
|
|
if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
ssl3_read_handshake_unexpected(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr = &s->s3->rrec;
|
|
uint32_t hs_msg_length;
|
|
uint8_t hs_msg_type;
|
|
CBS cbs;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We need four bytes of handshake data so we have a handshake message
|
|
* header - this may be in the same record or fragmented across multiple
|
|
* records.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (rr->length > 0 &&
|
|
s->s3->handshake_fragment_len < sizeof(s->s3->handshake_fragment)) {
|
|
s->s3->handshake_fragment[s->s3->handshake_fragment_len++] =
|
|
rr->data[rr->off++];
|
|
rr->length--;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len < sizeof(s->s3->handshake_fragment))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (s->internal->in_handshake) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This code currently deals with HelloRequest and ClientHello messages -
|
|
* anything else is pushed to the handshake_func. Almost all of this
|
|
* belongs in the client/server handshake code.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Parse handshake message header. */
|
|
CBS_init(&cbs, s->s3->handshake_fragment, s->s3->handshake_fragment_len);
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &hs_msg_type))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
if (!CBS_get_u24(&cbs, &hs_msg_length))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (hs_msg_type == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Incoming HelloRequest messages should only be received by a
|
|
* client. A server may send these at any time - a client should
|
|
* ignore the message if received in the middle of a handshake.
|
|
* See RFC 5246 sections 7.4 and 7.4.1.1.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->server) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hs_msg_length != 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl_msg_callback(s, 0, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
|
|
s->s3->handshake_fragment, s->s3->handshake_fragment_len);
|
|
|
|
s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* It should be impossible to hit this, but keep the safety
|
|
* harness for now...
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->session == NULL || s->session->cipher == NULL)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ignore this message if we're currently handshaking,
|
|
* renegotiation is already pending or renegotiation is disabled
|
|
* via flags.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s) || s->s3->renegotiate ||
|
|
(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) != 0)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!ssl3_renegotiate(s))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
if (!ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
} else if (hs_msg_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Incoming ClientHello messages should only be received by a
|
|
* server. A client may send these in response to server
|
|
* initiated renegotiation (HelloRequest) or in order to
|
|
* initiate renegotiation by the client. See RFC 5246 section
|
|
* 7.4.1.2.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!s->server) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* A client should not be sending a ClientHello unless we're not
|
|
* currently handshaking.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s)) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((s->internal->options & SSL_OP_NO_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->session == NULL || s->session->cipher == NULL) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Client requested renegotiation but it is not permitted. */
|
|
if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding ||
|
|
(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) != 0) {
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
|
|
SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->s3->hs.state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
|
|
s->internal->renegotiate = 1;
|
|
s->internal->new_session = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((ret = s->internal->handshake_func(s)) < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) {
|
|
ssl_force_want_read(s);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try again
|
|
* to obtain the (application) data we were asked for.
|
|
*/
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
|
|
* 'type' is one of the following:
|
|
*
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
|
|
* - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
|
|
* - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
|
|
*
|
|
* If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
|
|
* (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
|
|
*
|
|
* This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
|
|
* Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
|
|
* a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
|
|
* Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
|
|
* them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
|
|
* may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
|
|
* Change cipher spec protocol
|
|
* just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
|
|
* Alert protocol
|
|
* 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
|
|
* Handshake protocol
|
|
* 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
|
|
* to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
|
|
* here, anything else is handled by higher layers
|
|
* Application data protocol
|
|
* none of our business
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
|
|
{
|
|
SSL3_RECORD_INTERNAL *rr;
|
|
int rrcount = 0;
|
|
unsigned int n;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) {
|
|
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len < 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type != 0 && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
|
|
type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (peek && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
|
|
/* Partially satisfy request from fragment storage. */
|
|
unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
|
|
unsigned char *dst = buf;
|
|
unsigned int k;
|
|
|
|
/* peek == 0 */
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
while (len > 0 && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
|
|
*dst++ = *src++;
|
|
len--;
|
|
s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
|
|
n++;
|
|
}
|
|
/* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
|
|
for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
|
|
s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->internal->in_handshake) {
|
|
if ((ret = s->internal->handshake_func(s)) < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
if (ret == 0) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
start:
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do not process more than three consecutive records, otherwise the
|
|
* peer can cause us to loop indefinitely. Instead, return with an
|
|
* SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ so the caller can choose when to handle further
|
|
* processing. In the future, the total number of non-handshake and
|
|
* non-application data records per connection should probably also be
|
|
* limited...
|
|
*/
|
|
if (rrcount++ >= 3) {
|
|
ssl_force_want_read(s);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
|
|
rr = &s->s3->rrec;
|
|
|
|
if (rr->length == 0 || s->internal->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) {
|
|
if ((ret = ssl3_get_record(s)) <= 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We now have a packet which can be read and processed. */
|
|
|
|
if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
|
|
* 'peek' mode).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
|
|
if (type == rr->type) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make sure that we are not getting application data when we
|
|
* are doing a handshake for the first time.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (SSL_in_init(s) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
|
|
!tls12_record_layer_read_protected(s->internal->rl)) {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len <= 0)
|
|
return len;
|
|
|
|
if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
|
|
n = rr->length;
|
|
else
|
|
n = (unsigned int)len;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, &rr->data[rr->off], n);
|
|
if (!peek) {
|
|
memset(&rr->data[rr->off], 0, n);
|
|
rr->length -= n;
|
|
rr->off += n;
|
|
if (rr->length == 0) {
|
|
s->internal->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
|
|
rr->off = 0;
|
|
if (s->internal->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
|
|
s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
|
|
ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
|
|
* message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
|
|
if ((ret = ssl3_read_alert(s)) <= 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (s->internal->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
|
|
s->internal->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
|
|
* application data. If the library was running inside
|
|
* ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes
|
|
* sense to read application data at this point (session
|
|
* renegotiation not yet started), we will indulge it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->in_read_app_data != 0 &&
|
|
s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0 &&
|
|
(((s->s3->hs.state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
|
|
(s->s3->hs.state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
|
|
(s->s3->hs.state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)) || (
|
|
(s->s3->hs.state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
|
|
(s->s3->hs.state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
|
|
(s->s3->hs.state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)))) {
|
|
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
|
|
SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
if ((ret = ssl3_read_change_cipher_spec(s)) <= 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
|
|
if ((ret = ssl3_read_handshake_unexpected(s)) <= 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Unknown record type - TLSv1.2 sends an unexpected message alert while
|
|
* earlier versions silently ignore the record.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ssl_effective_tls_version(s) <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
|
|
rr->length = 0;
|
|
goto start;
|
|
}
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.key_block == NULL) {
|
|
if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
|
|
/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
|
|
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s->session->cipher = s->s3->hs.cipher;
|
|
if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tls1_change_read_cipher_state(s))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
|
|
* before we read the finished message.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!tls12_derive_peer_finished(s))
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
return (1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
ssl3_write_alert(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
|
|
return do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
|
|
sizeof(s->s3->send_alert));
|
|
|
|
return do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
|
|
sizeof(s->s3->send_alert));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If alert is fatal, remove session from cache. */
|
|
if (level == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
|
|
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
|
|
|
|
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
|
|
s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
|
|
s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If data is still being written out, the alert will be dispatched at
|
|
* some point in the future.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return ssl3_dispatch_alert(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
|
|
if ((ret = ssl3_write_alert(s)) <= 0) {
|
|
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
|
|
* If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
|
|
* we will not worry too much.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
|
|
(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
|
|
|
|
ssl_msg_callback(s, 1, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2);
|
|
|
|
ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,
|
|
(s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|